Class Certification and Mass Torts: Are "Immature"
Tort Claims Appropriate for Class Action Treatment?
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,' the United States Supreme
Court ventured for the first time into the quagmire known as the

mass tort class action. Although courts and scholars have been
grappling with class actions and mass torts for years,2 the Supreme
Court had not entered the fray prior to Amchem, and then the Court

decided only that product liability "settlement classes" must satisfy
most of the same requirements for certification as a class that is to be
litigated.!

Amchem did not, however, present the more vexing ques-

Counsel to Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, P.C., in Morristown, NewJersey
and
New York, New York. A.B., Columbia University, 1985; J.D., Rutgers Law School Newark, 1988.
117S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
2 While commentators disagree about precisely what a "mass tort" is, they generally agree that the concept began to gain attention in the 1980s, largely because
of a sizable jump in new asbestos cases. See generally Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A.
Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59

BROOK. L. REv. 961, 1004 (1993) ("Asbestos litigation has become the mass tort that
dwarfs all others."). The federal judiciary went into something of a crisis mode
based on a fear that the sheer weight of these cases would crush the judiciary. See
John C. Coffee,Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM.

L. REV. 1343, 1363 (1995). Professor Coffee views with some skepticism the claim
that mass torts are about to overwhelm the judiciary. See id. at 1351 n.23. He notes
that state and federal courts nationwide resolve approximately 500,000 auto accident cases a year and yet we hear of no impending crisis. See id. Rather, he suggests
that it is probably the concentration of large numbers of cases clogging certain
courts, a problem that may result from the class action phenomenon itself, that has
created the sense of urgency. See id.
See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248. The Court noted:
Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present
intractable management problems, see [FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) (D) ],
for the proposal is that there be no trial. But other specifications of
the rule - those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions - demand undiluted, even
heightened, attention in the settlement context.
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tion of whether class action treatment is appropriate for nationwide
product liability litigation, specifically claims that are scientifically
suspect or legally untested.
The Court has not lacked opportunities to address the issue.
Several circuit courts have held that where a product liability claim
has not yet achieved some sort of track record, i.e., a record of success with juries, class action treatment for the purposes of litigating
the cases is simply inappropriate. 4 The Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to review these rulings.
In 1996, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Advisory
Committee) proposed a rule change that would have forced courts
to address the issue and might have finally enticed the Supreme
Court to do the same.5 Among the rule changes discussed by the
Id.

, See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th
Cir. 1996)
(reversing an order certifying a nationwide class of all nicotine-dependent cigarette
smokers); In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1074 (6th Cir. 1996)
(granting a petition for a writ of mandamus to decertify a class of persons alleging
injury caused by defective penile implants); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51
F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir.) (granting a petition for awrit of mandamus to decertify a
class of persons alleging that they were infected with the AIDS virus from defendants' blood products), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995).
5 See FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (West 1996). As last revised, Rule
23 provides in pertinent part:
(a) PREREQUISITES TO A CLASS ACTION. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only
if (1) the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3)
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) CLASS ACTIONS MAINTAINABLE. An action may be maintained as
a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and
in addition:...
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in a particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
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Advisory Committee was the addition of a "maturity factor" requiring
courts to include in their analysis of predominance and superiority
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3) "the extent, nature,
and maturity of any related litigation involving class members."' Unfortunately, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Rules Committee) put this important amendment on hold
indefinitely.'
A rule that requires courts to consider whether litigation has
sufficiently "matured" so as to warrant class action treatment is long
overdue." Indeed, class action litigation may simply be inappropriate
for product liability litigation. Product liability class actions usually
serve as an effective case management tool only because they generally force defendants to settle or seek the protection of the bankruptcy laws. Where, however, scientific evidence has been carefully
scrutinized, legal theories have been accepted, and juries have found
liability, a mechanism that brings litigation to a close may be warranted. Where scientific evidence is questionable, legal theories are
untested, and juries have yet to consider a plaintiff's claims or, worse
still, have found those claims to be without merit, product manufacturers should not be compelled to bet their fate on a winner-take-all

In March 1991, the Judicial Conference directed the Advisory Committee "to
study whether Rule 23, F.R.C.P. be amended to accommodate the demands of mass
tort litigation." See Memorandum from Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham, Chair, Advisory
Committee of Civil Rules to Hon. Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of
Practiceand Procedure (May 17, 1996), reprinted at 167 F.R.D. 535, 536 (1996). The

Advisory Committee took more than five years to recommend changes to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Proposed Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure: Rule 23 Class Actions,
167 F.R.D. 559 (1996); Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Draft Minutes, 167 F.R.D. 540,
6

557 (1996).

See Class Action Lawsuits: Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
7

(March 5, 1998) (statement ofJudge AnthonyJ. Scirica, United States Circuit Court
Judge, Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit). Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist
authorized the creation of a working group that is studying mass torts in the federal
courts. All proposed rule changes that impact upon mass torts will be revisited by
this working group. See id.
8

See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV.

659, 659 (1989). The term "mature mass tort" as used here was defined in a 1989
article by Professor Francis McGovern, as one for which
there has been full and complete discovery, multiple jury verdicts, and
a persistent vitality in the plaintiffs' contentions. Typically, at the mature stage, little or no new evidence will be developed, significant appellate review of any novel legal issues has been concluded, and at
least one full cycle of trial strategies has been exhausted.
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class action trial. 9 In other words, instead of merely authorizing
courts to consider maturity in the mix of issues presented by an application for class certification, Rule 23 should be amended to forbid
certification of "immature" tort claims.10
II. PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION AND CLASS ACTIONS:
A STRANGE BEGINNING
The marriage of mass torts and class actions had a most unusual
start. In 1966, when the Advisory Committee proposed sweeping
changes in the rule governing class actions, mass tort litigation, especially product liability litigation, was largely unknown." Speaking
9 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (Third) § 33.26, at
360-61 (1997). Indeed, as the Manual for Complex Litigation states:
Fairness may demand that mass torts with few prior verdicts or judgments be litigated first in smaller units - even single-plaintiff, singledefendant trials - until general causation, typical injuries, and levels
of damages become established. Thus 'mature' torts like asbestos or
Dalkon Shield may call for procedures that are not appropriate for incipient mass tort case, such as those involving injuries arising from
new products, chemical substances, or pharmaceuticals.
Id.
10 In Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974), the Supreme
Court
stated that it could "find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that
gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit
in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action." Id. Courts
have held that Eisen precludes them from examining a claim's track record, insisting that it would constitute a prohibited inquiry into whether a claim has merit. See,
e.g., In re Copley Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 485, 489 (D. Wyo. 1994). But see
Haley v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643, 647 (C.D. Cal. 1996) ("[Clourts are not
likely to allow a class action if convinced that there is no realistic chance of success."). Other courts have taken a more flexible and seemingly sensible approach to
the issue. In Barnes v. American Tobacco Go., 176 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1997), for example, the court noted that the Supreme Court in Eisen had "explicitly warned that
a court considering class certification may not conduct a preliminary inquiry into
the merits of a suit. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has also instructed that a
court may look beyond the pleadings to determine whether the requirements of
Rule 23 have been satisfied." Id. at 489 (citations omitted). Thus, the Barnes court
astutely observed that it "must walk a thin line between the prohibition against examining the merits of the case and the obligation to examine the claims, defenses,
relevant facts, and applicable substantive law to make a determination of the certification issues presented . . . ." Id. This article addresses the issue by advocating a
rule change that would expressly allow a court to examine the merits of a claim as
part of its certification analysis. See Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen:
Why the Class Action Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 397-98
(1996) (advocating a rule change that would permit class certification only if plaintiffs demonstrated a "substantial possibility" of success on the merits).
11 See Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist
Perspective, 80
CORNELLL. REV. 941, 945 (1995). The Advisory Committee could not possibly have
anticipated the scope of the litigation that would define the mass tort in the 1980s
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of "mass accidents," by which it probably meant a number of individual claims arising out of a single event such as an airplane crash,
the Advisory Committee suggested that a class action would be inappropriate:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is
ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action
conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate into multiple lawsuits separately tried."
Thus, the mass tort class action was hatched in a committee that expressly disapproved of its use."
For years, leading commentators have claimed that, in keeping
with the recommendation of the Advisory Committee, courts have
rarely certified litigation classes in mass torts. 14 This assessment is
not entirely accurate, however, given that trial judges are in many inand the 1990s: asbestos, Agent Orange, intrauterine devices, DES, Bendectin,
breast implants, and tobacco. See id. at 945-946.
i

See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103

(1966). See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.) (involving
the collapse of a portion of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 988 (1982).

13
See generally Bruce H. Nielson, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?: Suggested
Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25

HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 461 (1988) (arguing that Rule 23 would have to be revised in order to certify mass tort class actions).
14 See, e.g., Barry F. McNeil & Beth L. Fancsali, Mass Torts and Class Actions:
Facing Increased Scrutiny, 167 F.R.D. 483, 488 (1996) ("[F]ederal courts remain reluctant to certify litigation (non-settlement) classes in mass tort cases."); Coffee, supra
note 2, at 1345 n.2 ("[Fiederal courts remain largely unreceptive to mass tort class
actions."). See also In re Chevron USA, Inc. 109 F.3d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1997)
(Jones,J, concurring) ('[Tihe use of innovative judicial techniques particularly to
resolve immature mass tort actions has been disfavored."). But see Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2250 (1997) ('[Dlistrict courts, since the late
1970s, have been certifying [mass tort] cases in increasing number."); In re A.H.
Robins Co. Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 734 (4th Cir. 1989) ("It is obvious that there is a
movement towards a more liberal use of Rule 23 in the mass tort context."). In fact,
class actions generally (not just mass tort class actions) have fallen in and out of favor. In a 1979 article, Professor Miller described a somewhat typical 15-year period
in the history of class actions. See Arthur R. Miller, Of FrankensteinMonsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "ClassAction Problem" 92 HARV. L. REv. 664 (1979).

He observed that beginning in 1964, in anticipation of the adoption of the rule,
and up through 1969, "the legal community exhibited considerable euphoria over
the rule's potential." Id. at 678. "[F]rom 1969 to approximately 1973 or perhaps
1974, antipathy to the class action became palpable." Id. at 679. Then, "the pendulum ...

swung again

. .

." Id. Professor Miller predicted "a period characterized by

increasing sophistication, restraint, and stabilization in class action practice." Id. at
680.
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stances all too willing to certify litigation classes of mind-boggling
size and scope and would undoubtedly continue to do so were appellate courts not willing to resort to extraordinary measures to restrain
them.' - The prevalence of these appellate decisions suggests that
trial judges have fallen victim to the superficial appeal of the class action device as a means of clearing overcrowded dockets. 6
As recently as the Summer of 1997, one scholar observed that
the "chilly reception of mass tort class actions in federal courts...
has changed the focus to state courts, either for national or statewide
classes." 7 Unfortunately, he may have spoken too soon. In at least
some federal circuits, it appears that the pendulum is swinging back
in favor of class actions, even where the case law strongly disapproves
of class actions. The Ninth Circuit, for example, in its 1982 decision
in In re Northern District of California,Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability Litigation,'8 seemed to rule out the use of class actions in product
liability litigation. Recently, however, the court distinguished its
prior opinion and held that Dalkon Shield did not "create[] an absolute bar to such certification in this circuit." 9 Similarly, the Sixth
15

See, e.g., In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996)

(writ of mandamus to decertify a class of between 15,000 and 200,000 persons); In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir.) (writ of mandamus to decertify a class of as many as 10,000 plaintiffs), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995); In re
Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 707 (5th Cir. 1990) (writ of mandamus to decertify
a class of 8,000 asbestos plaintiffs); In re Bendectin Prod. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300,
302 (6th Cir. 1984) (writ of mandamus to decertify class of more than 500 plaintiffs
who filed suit in the Southern District of Ohio and claimed injury from the drug
Bendectin). See also Amy S.Jones, Note, The Use of Mandamus to Vacate Mass Exposure
Tort Class Certification Orders, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 232, 236 (1997) (arguing that mass
tort class actions demand early appellate review that, until rule changes permit interlocutory review, can only be accomplished through the writ of mandamus). The
rule change permitting interlocutory appeals was the only proposed rule change
that was adopted by the Supreme Court. Unless Congress votes not to adopt the
change, it will become effective on December 1, 1998. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(f)
(West Supp. 1998).
16
See Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 Tax. L. Rv.
1821, 1822 (1995).
17 Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of FederalClass Actions
in Mass Torts, 39
ARIz. L. RaV. 595, 602 (1997). Almost simultaneously, other commentators claimed
that "the federal courts have recently expressed a greater tolerance, at least under
some circumstances, for the use of class actions to address mass tort litigation than
they did twenty years ago." Charles W. Schwartz & Lewis C. Sutherland, Class Certificationfor Environmentaland Toxic Tort Claims, 10 TUL. ENvL. L.J. 187, 191 (1997).
Is 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
19 Valentino v. Carter Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227,
1231 (9th Cir. 1996); accord
Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., No.
96-70243, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21047, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 5, 1997) (denying a
petition for a writ of mandamus, and stating that Valentino "significantly reshaped
and clarified the law of this circuit regarding the appropriateness of class certifica-
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Circuit may be reconsidering its position. In In re Telectronics Pacing
Systems, Inc.,0 the district court certified a nationwide class of persons
alleging injury from defective pacemaker leads. In an unpublished
order that may signal a move away from its prior holding in In re
American Medical Systems21 , the Sixth Circuit denied a petition for a
writ of mandamus to decertify the class.2 Accordingly, in light of the
conflict among the circuit courts, the Rules Committee should carefully rethink the role of class actions in product liability litigation. 3
III. WHAT'S WRONG WITH MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS?

In a nutshell, class actions unfairly stack the deck against defendants. For several reasons, class action treatment makes the risk of
proceeding to trial so great that most defendants simply choose to
settle, regardless of the strength of their defense on the merits.
Where a plaintiffs claim has not yet been shown to have merit, or
worse still, has been shown to be without merit, plaintiffs should not
be afforded the use of a procedural device that effectively prevents
the defendant from mounting a defense.
A.

Class Actions FavorPlaintiffs.
1.

Class Actions Increase the Number and Value of
Plaintiffs' Claims.

Class actions can attract plaintiffs in numbers that are truly staggering.24 For instance, when all federal breast implant cases were
transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in 1992,
5,000 cases were pending in state and federal court.5 When a possible $4.25 billion settlement class action was announced in 1994,
tion in cases involving multi-state plaintiffs asserting personal injury claims against
manufacturers of drugs and medical devices.").
20 172 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
1 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996).
22 See In reTelectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., No. 97-3448 (6th Cir.June 11, 1997).
23 See Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO.
L.J. 295, 298 (1996) ("[Clonflict [in the caselaw] provides additional impetus to
reform efforts directed at Rule 23 itself and, more generally, to discussion of innovations in civil procedure that might improve mass tort litigation.").
24 As one commentator has noted, when highways are constructed to ease traffic
congestion on smaller local roads, the volume of traffic increases substantially and
eventually the highway becomes just as congested, if not more so. See Edward H.
Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 13, 17
(1996). "The same consequence flows from procedural devices that aggregate small
claims into more convenient litigating units." Id.
25 See McGovern, supra note 17, at 610.
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10,000 lawsuits had been filed.2 At the time that the settlement collapsed with the bankruptcy
filing of Dow Coming, there were more
7
than 400,000 claimants.
Even if class certification does not attract new plaintiffs by aggregating claims, certification increases the amount awarded to the
average plaintiff. Research on jury behavior has demonstrated that
aggregating claims increases both the likelihood that a defendant
will be found liable and the amount that ajury will award. In other
words, the judgment entered in favor of a class of fifty plaintiffs will
likely exceed the sum of the judgments entered in favor of those
same fifty plaintiffs tried individually. An individual plaintiff with a
particularly strong case may be dragged down by a class of weaker
plaintiffs,2 but the presence of a severely injured plaintiff will increase the amount awarded to plaintiffs with less severe injuries and
thereby increase the total award.30
2.

Class Actions Mask Doubtful Scientific Proof.

A plaintiff alleging injury from a drug or toxic substance must
establish that the product causes injury in the general population
26

27

See id.
See id. at 611. Classes tend to attract substantial numbers of "parasitic" plain-

tiffs whose claims would be worthless were it not for the existence of the
John A. Siciliano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REv.
(1995). Class actions that attract plaintiffs and create a mass tort should
guished from class actions that are used to manage a large volume of cases
already been filed.
28 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION, supra note 9, at

§

class. See
990, 994
be distinthat have

33.26 n.1056 (citing

Kenneth S. Bordens & Irvin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort CivilLitigation: The Impact of Procedural Changes on jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATuRE 22 (1989)); see also Kenneth S. Bordens & Irvin A. Horowitz, The Effects of Outlier Presence, PlaintiffPopulation Size, and
Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil jury Decisions, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 209
(1988) [hereinafter Outlier Presence]. One court recently observed that class treatment can hide the weaknesses in the claims of individual plaintiffs because the
plaintiffs collectively are "able to litigate not on behalf of themselves but on behalf
of a 'perfect plaintiff' pieced together for the litigation." Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 20248, at *39 (4th Cir. Aug. 19,
1998).
29 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 165-66
(2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). The court noted that
[all plaintiffs may not desire class certification, however, because
those with a strong case may well be better off going it alone. The
drum-beating that accompanies a well-publicized class action .

.

. may

well attract excessive numbers of plaintiffs with weak to fanciful
cases .... If plaintiffs with strong claims remain members of the class,
they may see their claims diluted...
Id.
30

See Bordens & Horowitz, OutlierPresence,supra note 28, at 211-12, 226.
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(general causation) and that it caused his specific injuries (specific
causation).' Expert testimony supported by sound epidemiological
evidence is required in most instances."s Immature torts often lack a
tangible scientific foundation, usually because the necessary epidemiological studies are either in their developmental stages or do not
even exist." Thus, it should come as no surprise that certain tort
claims are litigated for years at tremendous expense to all parties yet
ultimately prove to be scientifically unsupportable 4
At best, this sort of expert testimony is highly technical and,
therefore, extremely difficult for juries to understand.35 At worst, an
31 See generally DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958
(3d Cir. 1990); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir.
1988).
32
See, e.g., Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1335, 1347 (S.D. Ind.
1992) ("A long series of federal cases supports the legal principle that an expert
medical opinion must have an epidemiological or scientific foundation to support a
reasonable finding of fact."), affid, 9 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 1993).
33
See, e.g., Gassie v. SMH Swiss Corp., No. 97-3557 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4193,
at *9 (E.D. La. March 26, 1998) (rejecting as "too vague and speculative" the class
action plaintiffs' claim that radioactive tritium from the luminescent dials of Swatch
watches caused "cell disruption"); Verb v. Motorola, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1287, 1295
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (rejecting as "conjecture and speculation" the class action plaintiffs' claim that high frequency electromagnetic radio waves emitted by cellular
phones cause the "breakdown of cells"). On the other hand, immature mass tort
class actions may work to the disadvantage of class members who are represented by
a plaintiff who has filed suit before the scientific community assembles the necessary proof. "[Ilt may deny compensation to individual plaintiffs who, due to claim
preclusion principles, cannot sue again if science should turn squarely in their favor
at a later date." Nagareda, supra note 23, at 317.
S4
See McNeil & Fancsali, supra note 14, at 496. In August 1996, commentators
recounted the history of the silicone breast implant class action, how it attracted
hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs, and resulted in bankruptcy for Dow Coming.
See id. They observed that newer studies had suggested that the implant manufacturers' causation defense was "stronger than originally thought" and argued that
"[i]f the scientific evidence ultimately concludes that silicone gel implants have not
caused the alleged injuries, the rush to aggregated judgment will surely be seen as
both unwise and unfair." Id. By the end of that year, an Oregon federal judge had
excluded the testimony of plaintiffs' experts, finding that the experts could not scientifically establish a causal link between breast implants and any systemic disease
or syndrome. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (D. Or.
1996); accord In rejoint S. & E. Dist. Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 960-61
(E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that the scientific literature "supports the conclusion
that the silicone implants at issue do not cause classical recognized diseases" and
has left only a "scintilla of plausibility" that the implants may cause atypical diseases"). Likewise, Federal Drug Administration scientists had concluded that the
epidemiological literature "tended to rule out large increases in risk for connective
tissue disease." Barbara G. Silverman, et al., Reported Complications of Silicone Gel
Breast Implants: An Epidemiological Review, 124 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 744, 754
(1996).
SeeJane Goodman et al., What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases, 21 TRIAL 65, 65-
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expert's unsupported speculation can cause juries to reach conclusions at odds with those generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community."
There are a number of reasons why expert testimony in product
liability litigation can mislead juries."7 First, juries are overwhelmed
by the expert witness' impressive credentials, and, because the testimony is so difficult to understand, the jury may simply follow the expert.! Second, juries are often faced with a choice between a large
69 (Nov. 1985) (stating that surveys ofjudges indicate they believe that jurors find
scientific and technical evidence to be the most confusing and juror surveys confirm
those beliefs). Paradoxically, the Federal Rules of Evidence require expert testimony precisely because lay jurors would be unable to understand the scientific issues without it. See FED. R. EVID. 702. Unfortunately, by inviting "scientific" experts
into the courtroom, judges may unwittingly reduce the likelihood that a "scientific"
result will emerge. As one court recently observed,
[sicience coexists uneasily with litigation's adversary system, as the
imperatives of partisan advocacy coupled with powerful economic incentives seem to overwhelm good science. Lawyers, judges, and forensic experts sometimes engage in what literature teachers call willful
suspension of disbelief. Scientific propositions that would cause even
laymen to gasp in disbelief are routinely argued in courts of law. Such
are the dangers of a legal system allowing partisan expert testimony.
Reiffv. Convergent Techs., Inc., 957 F. Supp. 573, 584 (D.N.J. 1997).
See, e.g., Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors
Think About Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGs L.J. 61, 120
n.154 (1995) (describing how jurors can find in favor of plaintiffs alleging injury
from exposure to Bendectin "[despite overwhelming scientific evidence showing
no statistically significant correlation between prenatal exposure to Bendectin and
the birth defects complained of"). Many commentators have argued that juries
overlook weaknesses in scientific evidence on causation when plaintiffs present
strong evidence of bad conduct on the part of the defendant, such as when a product manufacturer ignores or attempts to suppress early reports of a possible risk of
injury. See e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Ciminalization of
Mass Torts, 96 MicH. L. REv. 1121, 1168 (1998) ("Experimental research by cognitive psychologists indicates that mock juries tend to return more verdicts for plaintiffs when they consider close questions of scientific causation together with evidence of the defendant's fault, as compared to consideration of the causation issue
alone.") This phenomenon may explain the plaintiffs' verdicts in the Bendectin
and breast implant litigations. See id. at 1170.
37 Some commentators have argued that the scientific
issues presented by toxic
tort litigation are simply too complicated for a lay jury to decide. See, e.g., Dan
Drazan, The Case for Special Juries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72 JUDICATURE 292, 294
(1989).
See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[Slcientific
proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a
jury of laymen."); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973)
(arguing that expert testimony takes on an "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness"). Professor Tribe has argued that the more complex and technical the evidence, the more a lay jury is apt to give that evidence more weight than it deserves.
See Lawrence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
-LHAv. L. REv. 1329, 1334 (1971).
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corporation proffering complex scientific proofs on the one hand
and a severely injured plaintiff on the other. Not surprisingly, sympathy may carry the day."9
These problems are, of course, inherent in a system that permits
lay jurors to answer complex scientific questions. Since the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 40 federal courts have a greatly expanded role in ensuring the reliability of scientific testimony and, thereby, minimizing the risks that
juries will be fooled by charlatans masquerading as scientists. 4' Pro-

cedural devices that aggregate claims necessarily undermine the effort to improve the quality of jury decisions in cases involving scientific proofs. Obviously, if sympathy can trump reason when the jury
must decide one plaintiff's fate, then each and every additional
plaintiff increases the likelihood that emotion will prevent rational
decision making.
Moreover, a class of thousands of plaintiffs will make the scientific issues all the more confusing because the class itself mimics and
amplifies the worst elements of junk science. An epidemiological
study capable of proving that a drug or chemical causes disease can
be performed a number of ways. In general, all such studies examine persons who are exposed to a substance and compare the rate of
disease in the exposed population to the rate in an unexposed population.42 If the rate of disease in the exposed population exceeds that
39
See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 952 (3d Cir. 1990)
(suggesting that concern over the abuses of scientific evidence are "naturally
heightened when an expert is testifying on behalf of a plaintiff as sympathetic as a
child crippled by serious birth defects"); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
857 F.2d 823, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that where plaintiffs injuries evoke
sympathy it is "imperative that the court remain vigilant to ensure that neither emotion nor confusion has supplanted reason"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989); Lynch
v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d 1190, 1196 (1st Cir. 1987) (maintaining that the
emotion evoked by "the presence of handicapped youngsters could render a jury
'unable to arrive at an unbiased judgment'") (quoting In re Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., Bendectin Prod. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1224 (S.D. Ohio 1985)); see
alsoJoe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civiljury
Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 727, 768 (1991) ("[Slympathy engendered by evidence of
plaintiffs' injuries affectsjurors' determinations of liability.").

" 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

See United States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1265 (1998) ("[The exclusion
of unreliable evidence is a principal objective of many evidentiary rules."); General
Elec. Co. v.Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997) (holding that trial judges' rulings on the
admissibility of scientific evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion).
42 See generally REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIEINTFIc EVIDENCE
134-38 (1994); DAVID
E. LILIENFELD & PAUL D. STOLLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 198-99 (3d ed.
1994). In a "cohort study," a researcher assembles a group of persons exposed to a
substance and a group of persons who have not been exposed. See id. at 198-99.
41
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of the unexposed population, we can begin to draw conclusions on
causation.
To the untrained eye, a class of thousands of injured persons
looks like an appropriate study population. The jury is likely to reason that if thousands of plaintiffs were exposed to a substance and
all have contracted a disease, then the exposure must have caused
the disease. In fact, that type of logic, undoubtedly irresistible to jurors, stands the proper scientific method on its head. The presence
of thousands of persons who were exposed to a substance and allegedly contracted a disease says absolutely nothing about causation because it lacks any controls. This "study" tells the jury nothing about
the persons who were exposed to the substance but did not contract
the disease. Likewise, it ignores persons who were not exposed to
the substance and nonetheless contracted the disease.
Where scientific testimony has survived proper judicial screening and juries have ruled in favor of plaintiffs based on that testimony, class action treatment may be warranted. Where, on the other
hand, no such track record has been established, class actions create
too great a risk that speculation and sympathy will supplant scientific
reasoning."

The two groups are followed for a predetermined period of time, at which point
rates of disease are measured. See id. at 199. If the substance is associated with disease, then the study should find that the rate of disease is higher in the exposed
group. See id. A "case-control study" is similar, but works backwards. See id. at 226.
A group of persons with a disease is compared to a group without the disease by
looking back in time to determine rates of exposure. See id.
43 See generally, MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL:

EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996).

THE CLASH OF MEDICAL

The silicone breast implant litigation illustrates the phenomenon. Having read in the popular press
about the substantial number of persons claiming injury, a lay person would no
doubt conclude that there must be some relationship between breast implants and
disease. But as Dr. Marcia Angell points out, there are 100 million women in the
United States, ten million of whom (1 in 10) have breast implants and ten million
(1 in 10) who suffer from an autoimmune disease. See id. at 111-12. We would
therefore expect 10,000 women to have both. See id. While the lay person would
probably attribute scientific significance to proof that 10,000 women who have
breast implants contracted an autoimmune disease, in fact, that rate of disease is
merely the product of chance.
44
See, e.g., Tijerina v. Phillip Morris Inc., No. 95-CV-120-J, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20915, at *15-16 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 1996) (denying class certification, in part, because the existing scientific evidence did not support the plaintiffs' causation the-

ory).
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Class Actions Force Defendants to Settle.

Mass tort class actions are rarely tried, ' probably because defendants usually cannot win them. As discussed above, class action
treatment substantially improves the plaintiffs' chance of winning a
judgment and increases the amount of thatjudgment. Nonetheless,
even where the probability of a judgment remains low, defendants
cannot risk trial because the sheer size of a potential judgment
would likely destroy the company.46 Plaintiffs are acutely aware of
this "bet-the-company" phenomenon and seek to certify classes precisely because of their power to coerce settlements."
45 See Schuck, supra note 11, at 958 & n.85 (describing
an important conference
on class actions at which "none of the large group of knowledgeable participants
could think of a single nationwide products liability or property damage class action
that had gone to trial."); see also In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prod. Liab.
Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 349 (D.N.J. 1997) ("[Tlhe parties agreed at the time of oral
argument on [the class certification] motion that no federal court had tried a class
action which would require the application of the laws of fifty-one jurisdictions.").
46 See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463, 476 (1978) ("Certification of
a large class may so increase the defendant's potential damages liability and litigation costs that he may find it economically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious defense."); accord Miller, supranote 14, at 679 n.63 ("[T]he specter of crushing liability increases a case's settlement value and as a result may encourage
plaintiffs counsel to seek class action status."); McGuire, supra note 10, at 373 n.26
(collecting studies on securities class actions that find that they "are often settled for
amounts that do not reflect the merits of the cases"). But see Thomas E. Willging et
al., An EmpiricalAnalysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 74, 145, 146 (1996) (reporting the results of an empirical study by the Federal
Judicial Center that failed to demonstrate a relationship between the timing of class
certification and settlement). As some courts have noted, any procedure that aggregates cases can create settlement pressure if improperly used. See, e.g., In re
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1997) (JonesJ. concurring) (a
poorly designed bellwether trial resulting in a plaintiffs' verdict can "create enormous momentum for settlement"); In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368,
374 (2d Cir. 1993) (opining that improper consolidation of cases can force settlement by requiring defendants to participate in extensive proceedings that do not
concern them); see also Richard 0. Faulk et al., Building a Better Mousetrap? A New
Approach to Trying Mass Tort Cases, 29 TEx. TECH L. Rsv. 779, 787 (1998) (noting
that because of a substantial risk of an unjust resolution of the claims, courts should
exercise caution when applying "creative judicial solutions" to immature torts).
47 Not long after the 1966 revisions to Rule 23,
commentators began using variations on the term "blackmail" to describe a class action's power to coerce a settlement. See Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9 (1971)
("legalized blackmail"); HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW
120 (1973) ("blackmail settlements"). More recently, variations on the term have
appeared in many judicial opinions. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) ("judicial blackmail"); In re General Motors Corp.,
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir.) ("legalized
blackmail"), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824 (1995). Courts and commentators have not
hesitated to use disparaging terms to describe class actions. In Eisen v. Carlisle &
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In In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.," defendants petitioned for a
writ of mandamus to decertify a Rule 23(c) (4) (A) class of as many as
10,000 hemophiliacs who had become infected with the AIDS virus,
allegedly from using defendants' blood products."9 At the time the
class action order was entered by the district court, defendants faced
approximately 300 suits involving about 400 plaintiffs, of which thirteen suits had been tried with defendants winning twelve (92.3%)."0
The court posited that "if class-action treatment [were] denied," and
the defendants continued to enjoy the same rate of success for all
300 trials, the defendants' worst-case exposure to damage awards
should be no more than $125 million.' Yet, if only 5,000 of the total
pool of 10,000 class members were able to proceed as a class to trial,
defendants would face potential exposure of $25 billion, in other
words, certain financial ruin. 2 Rather than face that risk, defendants
would certainly settle.
The Seventh Circuit held that the certification order was interlocutory and thus technically unappealable." But because the certification order was, like all mass tort class certifications, certain to
force a settlement, the court found that it was effectively unreviewable on appeal and therefore appropriate for review by mandamus. 4
After deriding class actions in rather strong terms, the court then issued a somewhat unconvincing disclaimer:

Jacquelin,391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), for example, ChiefJudge Lumbard described
the class action at issue in that case as a "Frankenstein Monster," id.at 572
(Lumbard, C.J., dissenting), a term that was later used to describe class actions generally. See San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.R.D. 435, 436
(W.D. Tex. 1975).
48 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 867 (1995).
49 See id. at 1294.

Set id. at 1296.
51 See id.at 1298-99.
50

The court's calculation of total damage awards based on
individual trials probably overestimates defendants' potential liability. The court
appears to have assumed that, despite a success rate of less than one victory per 10
trials, plaintiffs would nonetheless go forward with trial in all 300 cases. Given the
substantial cost of litigating suits of this complexity, it is hard to believe that plaintiffs would continue to try the cases absent a dramatic improvement in their rate of
success. See Nagareda, supranote 23, at 303 ("The failure of plaintiffs to prevail in a
number of individual trials will make the particular subject matter sufficiently unattractive that prospective plaintiffs - and attorneys who might seek out such persons
for representation on a contingency fee basis - will be unlikely to incur the burden
of additional suits."). Indeed, the timing of the class certification motion in RhonePoulenc may have been motivated by this realization.
52 See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298.
53 See id. at 1294.
See id. at 1299.
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We do not want to be misunderstood as saying that class actions
are bad because they place pressure on defendants to settle. That
pressure is a reality, but it must be balanced against the undoubted benefits of the class action that have made it an authorized procedure for employment by federal courts. We have yet to
consider the balance. All that our discussion to this point has
shown is that the first condition for the grant of mandamus that the challenged rulin9 not be effectively reviewable at the end
of the case - is fulfilled.
Having suggested that the pressure to settle would not figure in its
decision on the merits of class certification, the court immediately
returned to the issue. 56 The court expressed a "concern with forcing
these defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of bankruptcy to settle even if they
have no legal liability" particularly where "the preliminary indications
are that the defendants are not liable for the grievous harm that has
befallen the members of the class." 7
The Seventh Circuit did not address squarely the question of
whether the blood products litigation might become suitable for
class action treatment if future trials began to go the plaintiffs' way.
Similarly, the court declined to suggest precisely how many plaintiffs'
verdicts would be required before certification might be permitted. 8

55 Id.
Notably, the dissenting opinion was largely based on the argument that the
economic forces unleashed by certification of a large class are simply a by-product of
a rule that the court was obliged to follow. Indeed, consistent with the position
taken here,Judge Rovner stated that a "preference for avoiding a class trial and for
submitting the negligence issue 'to multiple juries constituting in the aggregate a
much larger and more diverse sample of decision-makers' is a rationale for amending the rule, not for avoiding its application in a specific case." Id. at 1308 (Rovner,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
57 Id. at 1299.
The Castano court has been similarly criticized for failing "to provide a workable definition of tort maturity." See Recent Case, Fifth Circuit Decertifies Nationwide To-

bacco Class - Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), 110
HARv. L. REv. 977, 979 (1997). It was not, however, necessary for either the Castano
or Rhone-Poulenc courts to reach that issue. In Castano, plaintiffs alleged that defendants wrongfully caused them to become addicted to tobacco, a theory that had
never before been tested at trial. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 749. Indeed, the tobacco
companies have a long and unbroken record of defeating these claims on the merits. See Henry J. Reske, Tobacco Suit: Round II: Plaintiffs' Lauyers Pledge to File Class
Actions in All 50 States, 82 A.B.A. J. 18 (July 1996) (stating that the tobacco companies are "fond of pointing out [that] they have never ultimately lost a case in 40
years of litigation"). In Rhone-Poulenc, plaintiffs' unusual theory of liability had been
tested in only a few jurisdictions and had failed 12 of 13 times. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51
F.3d at 1296.
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Instead, the court only held that it would not allow the plaintiffs to
use class certification to reverse the direction of the litigation."
B. Mass Tort Class Actions Do Not Present Common Questions ofFact
or Law Nor Do Those Questions PredominateOver Issues Affecting
IndividualPlaintiffs.
A mass tort litigation class may only be certified if the plaintiffs
establish that the class meets the relevant requirements of Rule 23.W
Plaintiffs must show, among other things,
that there are "questions
" 61
of law or fact common to the class, that those common questions
"predominate over any questions affecting only individual members," and that "a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."6 3
" One commentator has argued that a maturity test that requires several trials
and success on the merits may simply enhance defendants' institutional advantage
in the early stages of mass tort litigation. See Fifth Circuit Decertifies Nationwide Tobacco Class, supra note 58, at 982 n.49 (delaying class certification until a significant
number of plaintiffs succeed at trial would create "a high threshold given that defendants' informational and strategic advantages lead to a high success rate in the
early stages of a tort's maturation"). This argument is rooted in an outdated model
of the relationship between mass tort plaintiffs and defendants in which defendants
had far superior resources with which to fight tort claims. Today, the plaintiffs' bar
can amass resources that certainly level the playing field and may actually give plaintiffs an advantage if a diverse group of defendants does not coordinate litigation
strategies. SeeJACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUALJusTICE IN MAss TORT LTIGATION: THE
EFFEcr OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVIcES 76
(1995) ("[TIhe success of the mass tort plaintiffs' bar, particularly in the asbestos
cases, has furnished it with so much capital, managerial skills, and expertise that it
can quickly move into new fields of opportunity."). Moreover, a maturity rule could
also prevent plaintiffs from wasting resources by pursuing a claim the strength of
which they may have misjudged. See Maxwell M. Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job, 55 F.R.D. 365, 370-71 (1972) (advocating a hearing on the merits of
plaintiffs' claims prior to certification to avoid the "sheer waste" of litigating a class
action that cannot succeed). Professor Coffee describes a hypothetical litigation in
which a class is certified before the scientific community has established the validity
of the claim. See Coffee, supra note 2 at 1439. Summary judgment is granted and
the class action is dismissed. See id. Sufficient scientific evidence is later found, but
the class members (including future claimants) may be barred from litigating their
claims. See id. "Delaying the certification of the class action until the scientific evidence clearly supports plaintiffs (if indeed that is the outcome) thus may benefit
future claimants over the long run." Id.
60 See Castano,84 F.3d at 740; In re American Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069,
1086 (6th
Cir. 1996).
61
FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(a) (2). Since Rules 23(b) (1) and (b) (2) are generally inapplicable to mass tort class actions, the class must meet the requirements of Rule
23(a) and the additional requirements of Rule 23(b) (3).
62 FED. R. Civ. P.
23 (b)(3).
63 Id. Indeed, the Advisory Committee for the 1966 rule amendments
recognized that in Rule 23(b) (3) situations, "class-action treatment is not as clearly called

1998]

CLASS CERTIFICATION AND MASS TORTS

All mass tort class actions suffer from two flaws. First, the issue
of whether a product caused a particular plaintiffs disease differs for
each plaintiff, affected by the plaintiffs predisposition to the disease,
exposure to other substances that may cause the disease, and different levels of exposure to the product at issue over different periods
of time." Second, because of the difficulties encountered in determining which state's law applies to the claims and then analyzing the
law of each state, it is nearly impossible to show that common questions of law will predominate and that a class action will be superior
to
some these
other form of adjudication. 65 Immature tort class actions
magnify
inherent flaws.
1. Without a History of Trials, Courts Cannot Determine
Whether Common Factual Issues Predominate.
Class actions conserve judicial resources by allowing a court to
avoid needlessly trying and retrying the issues common to all class
members.66 Where, however, the court is asked first to conduct a
trial on the common issues to be followed by hundreds of separate
trials on individual issues, "the economies of scale achieved by class
treatment are more than offset by the individualization
of numerous
6
issues relevant only to a particular plaintiff.",

In product liability litigation, causation necessarily turns on
facts that differ with each plaintiff. Thus, the Third Circuit Court of
for as in [Rule 23(b)1 and (b)2]." Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Rule 23 Class Actions, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966). Thus, the additional pre-

requisites set forth in 23(b) (3) were intended to insure that classes were certified
only where they "would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." Id. at 102-03.
See Hurd v. Monsanto Co., 164 F.R.D. 234, 240 (S.D. Ind. 1995).

See Castano,84 F.3d at 747 (The "certification of an immature tort results in a
higher than normal risk that the class action may not be superior to individual adjudication."); Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
("[Tihe lack of a prior track record of trials in these types of cases makes it practicallZ impossible to draw information necessary to make the superiority analysis.").
See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp. 855 F.2d 1188, 1196 (Rule 23(b)(3)

classes are designed primarily "to achieve the economies of time, effort and expense.").
67 In re American Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th Cir. 1996). A few
courts
have used Rule 23(c) (4) (A) subclasses to address this problem, but none have actually established that this approach is workable at trial. See, e.g., In re Telectronics
Pacing Systems, Inc. 164 F.R.D. 222, 230 (S.D. Ohio 1995); In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc. 161 F.R.D. 456, 465-66 (D. Wyo. 1995). Others have observed that an ap-

proach "whereby subclasses of plaintiffs are created and only certain elements of
some causes of action are heard, seems inherently complicated and incredibly inefficient." Haley v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643, 656 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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Appeals' observations about an asbestos settlement class action are
applicable to almost any product liability class action:
Class members were exposed to different asbestos-containing
products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and
over different periods. Some class members suffer no physical injury or have only asymptomatic pleural changes, while others suffer from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from mesothelioma
- a disease which, despite a latency period of approximately fifteen to forty years, generally kills its victims within two years after
they become symptomatic. Each has a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the causation inquiry. .
It is quite possible that a series of trials will show that the differences
between plaintiffs are of little significance. 6' Likewise, following a series of trials, a district court could conclude that the efficiency of future trials would be greatly advanced by a class trial on a particular
issue or issues followed by individual trials. Where, however, tort
claims lack such a record of trials, the court cannot possibly know
whether the common issues predominate over the individual issues
or whether resolution70of the common issues will result in more efficient individual trials.
2.

Immature Mass Tort Class Actions Present
Unmanageable Choice of Law Problems.

A product liability action in federal court is governed by state
substantive law. 71 To determine which state's law to apply, the district
court must apply the choice of law rules of the jurisdiction in which
it sits, 7" except if the action was transferred, in which case the court
Georgine v. Amchem Prods, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996),
affid sub
nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997); accord American Med.
Sys., 75 F.3d at 1081 ("Proofs .

.

. will also vary from plaintiff to plaintiff because

complications with an AMS device may be due to a variety of factors, including surgical error, improper use of the device, anatomical incompatibility, infection, device
malfunction, or psychological problems."); Haley, 169 F.R.D. at 654 ("Given the fact
that approximately 66,000 individuals had these leads implanted, there are potentially 66,000 different instances that the Court would have to examine to determine
if defendant's conduct was the real cause of injury for each potential plaintiff.").
69 SeeJenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782
F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[T]o
'predominate,' common issues must constitute a significant part of the individual
cases.").
70 See Castano, 84 F.3d at 745 ("Absent knowledge
of how addiction-as-injury
cases would actually be tried, however, it would be impossible for the court to know
whether the common issues would be a 'significant' portion of the individual trials.").
71 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
72 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).

1998]

CLASS CERTI7CATION AND MASS TORTS

must apply the transferor court's choice of law rules." Class actions
are no different since such choice of law determinations are constitutionally mandated. 4 A court deciding whether to certify a class
"may not take a transaction with little or no relationship to the forum and apply the law of the forum in order to satisfy the procedural
requirement that there be a 'common question of law.'" 5 Rather, it
must6 "apply an individualized choice of law analysis" for each plaintiff.

Once it determines which state's law applies to a particular
plaintiff's claim, the court must analyze that state's law and determine whether it is the same or at least substantially similar to the
state law that will apply to other class members.
This analysis is
necessary because variations in state law may either defeat predominance 78 or may simply present so many case management problems
as to defeat superiority. 9
73 See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S.
516, 532 (1990); see also In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 348 (D.N.J. 1997)
(holding that a court must apply the transferor court's choice of law rules to claims
transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation).
74 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-23
(1985).
75 Id. at 821 (citations omitted); accord In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1302 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts is, after
Erie, designed merely to provide an alternative forum for the litigation of state law
claims, not an alternative system of substantive law for diversity cases."); In re School
Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1007 (3d Cir.) ("[The dictates of state law may not be
buried under the vast expanse of a federal class action."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852
(1986).
76 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627
(3d Cir. 1996), affd sub
nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (1997); accord Andrews v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 F.3d 1014, 1024 (11th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that
scrutinizing plaintiffs' claim "under the provisions of fifty jurisdictions complicates
matters exponentially"). Even where the class is defined as citizens of a single state,
a court may nonetheless face choice of law problems because plaintiffs were exposed to the product when they lived in other states. See, e.g., Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (claims of class members
who smoked in other states and then moved to Missouri would probably be governed by other states' law).
7
See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996) ("In a
multi-state class action, variations in state law may swamp any common issues and
defeat predominance."). Vague assurances that there are no differences between
state laws will not suffice. See Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1012 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987); accord Peoples v. American Fidelity Life
Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 637 (N.D. Fla. 1998); Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., 178 F.R.D.
493, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (plaintiffs' "overly simplistic" description of four subclasses
to manage state consumer fraud claims was insufficient to establish that common
questions predominate).
78 See Castano, 84 F.3d at 741 ("A requirement that a court know which law will
apply before making a predominance determination is especially important when
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Immature mass torts often present novel legal issues that magnify the problems created by variations in state law. A federal court
sitting in diversity must decide state law issues as the highest court of
the state would decide them. 0 Where the law is unclear, as it often is
in product liability litigation, the federal court must predict how the
state's highest court would rule.8 ' This is a task for which federal
judges admit they are ill-suitedi8 They likewise admit that their predictions are all too often incorrect."
there may be differences in state law."); Georgine,83 F.3d at 618.
79
See In re American Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th Cir. 1996) ("If more than
a few of the laws of the fifty states differ, the districtjudge would face an impossible
task of instructing ajury on the relevant law, yet another reason why class certification would not be the appropriate course of action."); School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d
at 1011 (noting management problems created by application of different state
laws); Harding v. Tambrands, Inc., 165 F.R.D. 623, 632 (D. Kan. 1996)
("[I]nstructing the jury in a manner that is both legally sound and understandable
to ajury of laypersons would be a herculean task."). Courts must be wary of plaintiffs who propose to jettison unmanageable claims rather than present a plan to address the case management problems created by those claims. Such plaintiffs
probably cannot adequately represent the class. See, e.g., Arch v. American Tobacco
Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("[A] willingness to gerrymander claims
precluded a finding that the named plaintiffs were fit to represent the
class ... Indeed, named plaintiffs who would intentionally waive or abandon potential claims of absentee plaintiffs have interests antagonistic to those of the class.");
Pearl v. Allied Corp., 102 F.R.D. 921, 923 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("[Pllaintiffs' efforts to
certify a class by abandoning some of the claims of their fellow class members have
rendered them inadequate class representatives.").
8o See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Commissioner v.
Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) ("If there be no decision by that Court
then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law giving 'proper
regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the state.").
81 See, e.g., Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp., 137 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 1998)
(stating that if the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has not decided an issue, the federal court must look to "analogous state court decisions, persuasive adjudications by
courts of the states, learned treatises, and public policy considerations identified in
state decisional law in order to make an informed prophecy of how the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court would rule"); Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291,
293 (3d Cir. 1995) ("We are relegated to predicting what the Supreme Court of
New Jersey would do if it were confronted with this question."). See also In re
"Norplant" Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997)
(predicting that state court would apply the learned intermediary doctrine to bar
claims that manufacturer failed to provide warnings directly to patients); Dennis v.
Pertec Computer Corp., 927 F. Supp. 156, 162 (D.NJ. 1996) (predicting that in
.repetitive stress injury litigation" New Jersey law would not require a computer
keyboard manufacturer to warn of the risk of injury from repetitive use), affd, 135
F.3d 764 (3d Cir. 1997).
See, e.g., Sargent v. Columbia Forest Prods., Inc., 75 F.3d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir.
1996) (noting that Vermont has no certification statute and, therefore, courts are
required to guess, often incorrectly, as to the law of Vermont); Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at
302 (Becker, J., dissenting) ("Especially in cases such as this where little authority
governs the result, the litigants are left to watch the federal court spin the wheel.
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If predicting state law in an individual action unnecessarily burdens federal judges, then a class action presenting novel legal issues
increases that burden one-hundred fold.84 The federal judge must
undertake the arduous task of predicting the law of the state in
which he sits and with which he is probably most familiar, and then
he must proceed to predict the law of states with which he probably
has had little or no experience." If federal judges often incorrectly
predict the law of the jurisdiction in which they sit, they cannot possibly be expected accurately to predict the law of fifty states. 86 If they
cannot predict the law of the states in the jurisdictions that will govern the plaintiffs' claims, courts cannot even begin to determine

Meanwhile, federal judges, by no means a high-rolling bunch, are put in the uncomfortable position of making a choice."); McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622
F.2d 657, 661-62 (3d Cir.) ("Although some have characterized this assignment as
speculative crystal-ball gazing, nonetheless it is a task we may not decline."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980). In these cases, the courts decried the task of predicting
state law on the full record submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment. On a motion to certify a class, the districtjudge is presented with a far more
sparse record.
83 See Dolores K. Sloviter, A FederalJudge Views Diversity Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REv. 1671, 1679-80 (1992) (describing several instances in which the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals incorrectly predicted how the New Jersey or Pennsylvania Supreme Courts would rule). In Hakimoglu, Judge Becker asked NewJersey
to adopt a certification procedure, noting that "forty-three state supreme courts, the
court of last resort in Puerto Rico, and the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia can answer certified questions of law from federal circuit courts." Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 303. This procedure obviously provides no help to district judges
who must predict state law to resolve motions to certify nationwide class actions. See
T. Dean Malone, Comment, Castano v. American Tobacco Co. and Beyond: The Propriety of Certifying Nationwide Mass-Tort Class Actions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 When the Basis of the Suit is a "Novel" Claim or Injury, 49 BAY'LOR L. REv. 817,
844 (1997).
See Malone, supra note 83, at 844 ("[A] court may have to certify the same
question to all fifty states, each of which may give a different answer.").
85 See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (Judges addressing another state's law are "'outsiders' lacking the common exposure to local law which
comes from sitting in the jurisdiction.").
86 SeeMalone, supranote 83, at820 ("[Ilf a plaintiff class alleges a 'novel' injury,
or one that a state court has never developed, then the certifying federal court has
no law to apply."). The author argues that "[ilf the entire Castano plaintiff class included only domiciliaries of a single state and plaintiffs filed the action in their state
court system, little concern would exist about the propriety of a state court determining the viability of a new or 'novel' injury." Id. at 819. He cites as an example a
Florida court that refused to certify a nationwide class of plaintiffs seeking compensation for tobacco addiction, but certified a statewide class of the same description.
Id. at 819 n.20 (citing RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 40-42 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)). This was, of course, a state court. A federal districtjudge, on
the other hand, faces the additional hurdle of trying to divine state law on a bare
record.
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whether common questions of law or fact predominate or whether a
class will be superior to other methods of litigating the claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mass tort class actions are often inefficient and unfair to defendants. The addition of an "immature" claim to the equation simply
exacerbates everything that is wrong with mass tort classes and tips
the balance against certification. Accordingly, Rule 23 should be
amended to forbid certification of immature tort class actions.
Various formulations have been proposed for determining
when a tort has sufficiently matured so as to permit certification.
Complete discovery, careful scrutiny of scientific expert testimony,
acceptance of plaintiff's theories under relevant state law by trial
(and perhaps appellate) judges, and several plaintiffs jury verdicts
are probably minimum requirements. A precise definition of maturity is unnecessary and a determination of whether a tort has sufficiently matured would be better left to the reasonable discretion of
the trial judge. An immature tort, on the other hand, is easily defined as one that is wholly lacking in any of these prerequisites. Immature torts are unsuitable for class action treatment.

See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 749 (5th Cir. 1996)
("The
primary procedural difficulty created by immature torts is the inherent difficulty a
district court will have in determining whether the requirements of rule 23 have
been met."); In re Stucco Litig., 175 F.R.D. 210, 214 (E.D.N.C. 1997) ("There is no
history of litigation ...

to help crystallize the issues

. .

."); In re "Norplant" Contra-

ceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 577, 578 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (explaining that in
the absence of several individual trials, the court could not make predominance
and superiority determinations and therefore plaintiffs' motion to certify a class was
denied as "premature"). Because of the problems created by variations in state law,
district courts in the Fifth Circuit have held that they are effectively prohibited from
certifying nationwide classes where plaintiffs' tort claims arise under state law. See
Borskey v. Medtronics, Inc., No. 94-2302, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3732, at *8 (E.D.
La. March 18, 1998); In re Masonite Corp. Hardboard Siding Prods. Liab. Litig., 170
F.R.D. 417, 421 (E.D. La. 1997).

